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Claudia A. Lewis
The definitional equation of marriage with heterosexuality forms a self-
enclosed system inaccessible to single-gender couples who desire equal
protection under the law for their intimate enduring relationships. The
summary state denial of homosexual marriage2 exposes the fundamental
right to marry, deemed to inhere in the individual,' as an exclusive privi-
lege conditioned upon heterosexual orientation.
During the past decade, commentators have argued that the proscrip-
tion of homosexual marriage violates the constitutional mandate of equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 They have unwittingly as-
sumed, however, that the Court would take such challenges seriously, and
that conventional equal protection analysis provides a principled and co-
herent means to eliminate the selective application of the right to marry.
After Bowers v. Hardwick, wherein the Court ridiculed homosexuals'
claim to privacy for their intimate sexual relations as "at best, facetious,"'
homosexuals' claim to marry may readily be dismissed by the Court as "at
best, absurd."
This Note examines the homosexual marriage challenge anew to inves-
tigate, through the lens of feminist jurisprudence,6 why the courts have
1. There is a danger in labeling the discourse in this Note "feminine" as it threatens to exclude
and may fail to engage male readers. Such separation may lead to its devaluation. But to name, at
times, is to empower. Lecture by Professor Toril Moi at Yale Graduate School (December, 1987).
My purpose in employing feminist theory is to demonstrate that its lens of questioning, rethinking,
and redefining terms promises valuable insights into the law in a voice new to, but compatible with,
the legal domain.
2. See Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) (homosexual marriage prohibi-
tion upheld); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (same); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn.
310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971) (same), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). Most state statutes do
not expressly prohibit single-gender marriage. But see TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §1.01 (Vernon 1975)
("A license may not be issued for the marriage of persons of the same sex.")
3. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("the freedom to marry . . . resides with the
individual").
4. See, e.g., Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on the Right to Marry - Why Can't
Fred Marry George - or Mary and Alice at the Same Time?, 10 J. CONTEMP. L. 33 (1984); Note,
The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973). But see Buchanan, Same-Sex Mar-
riage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 541 (1985).
5. 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
6. Rather than setting a particular political agenda, as a jurisprudential method, feminism is pri-
1783
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 1783
refused and will continue to refuse to recognize homosexuals' fundamental
right to marry. Feminist legal scholars have shown the inadequacy of
traditional equal protection analysis to overcome the pervasive gender ine-
quality that impedes women's full integration into the workplace.7 Equal
protection theory and doctrine also fail to respond to the forced invisibility
of homosexual relationships." "Strict scrutiny" of the single-gender mar-
riage claim reveals that conventional analysis suffers from an impover-
ished conceptual framework of equality, most notable for what it ignores:
human interconnection and care.
The inclusion of the "ethic of care," associated with the feminine moral
voice, and a more serious concern for the existing "ethic of justice" in
equality discourse promises a richer vision of equality grounded in respect
for the multiplicity of human differences and moral responsibilities to
others.9 Empathy provides a new tool to expand the dialogue and enrich
the moral imagination. Under such an expanded moral framework, the
substantive right to equality moves beyond the anti-discrimination princi-
ple and approaches an affirmative right to connection to and response
from the community. Homosexuals' right to marry originates from this
broader right of attachment, for the most intimate human connections
form the building blocks to a cohesive community.
marily a process of consciousness raising, of questioning the law and the view of human nature under-
lying it. Feminist scholars critique and strive to resist the abstraction and professed objectivity of legal
doctrine and rules in seeking solutions to inequality. See Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurispru-
dence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1374-75 (1986). They self-consciously avoid translating
problems of social inequity into legal language, see Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimina-
tion: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REv. 265, 286-87 (1984),
turning instead to psychological and philosophical theories on relationalism in social thought as tools
to create an enlarged legal dialogue intended to respond more persuasively to the human predicament.
Because feminists tend to avoid the universal, feminist theory is offered as one of many lenses through
which to percieve truth and yield partial and contingent explanations. Lecture by Professor Clare
Dalton at Yale Law School (November, 1987) (on post-modern feminism). This Note is not based on
a single feminist theory, or solely on feminist theory, as no single theory should attempt to speak for
all feminists. The feminist method is destructive only when it is insistent and inflexible. Id. See Mi-
now, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10,
62-66 (1987) [hereinafter Justice Engendered]. (Professor Minow has adopted a "social relations"
approach to equality jurisprudence, informed and inspired by feminist theory though not avowedly
"feminist.")
7. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARRASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); Finley,
Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM.
L. REv. 1118 (1986); Scales, supra note 6.
8. This Note exposes the failure of our legal system to address not only overt discrimination
against homosexuals, but also homosexuals' basic needs with regard to the family. Cf Finley, supra
note 7, at 1143, n.110 (pregnancy discrimination reflects similar failure with regard to women's
needs). The "feminist" method applies not only to women's issues, but to all human issues.
9. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN's DEVEL-
OPMENT (1982). The "ethic of care" and "ethic of justice" respectively refer to girls' and boys' typical
modes of solving moral dilemmas. The ethic of care, or responsibility, "relies on the concept of equity,
the recognition of differences in need," while the ethic of justice, or rights, is "a manifestation of equal




I. THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
A. The Impoverished Equal Protection Ideal
The ideal of equality underlying traditional equal protection analysis
demands only that persons who are alike must be treated alike.10 The
proclamation of difference, therefore, legitimizes existing inequity."
Under the "similarly situated" ideal, biological and deep psycho-social
differences pose a formidable barrier to equal treatment. To prove their
suitability to marry, homosexual couples will either have to deny the im-
portance of the sexual aspect of marriage or diminish the significance of
their sexual orientation. Because the former is unthinkable, homosexual
couples will have to deny their difference to achieve equality. From the
feminist perspective, it is discriminatory to force homosexuals, as a pre-
condition to their access to fundamental rights, to declare the irrelevance
of an essential aspect of their humanity."
The "similarly situated" ideal equating equality with sameness and dif-
ference with inferiority is flawed not only because it devalues human indi-
viduality but also because it offers no guidelines for determining when two
persons are alike or not for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
It "reposes confidence in the perceptions of the judiciary about similarities
that transcend as well as differences that endure."1 The judiciary would
have us believe that this ideal offers an objective and value-neutral ap-
proach to inequality. It does not. A prejudice towards difference, towards
those unlike the norm, is built into equality jurisprudence.
10. See e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) ("all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike").
11. Dalton, supra note 6 (where law sees difference, it justifies disadvantages).
12. Lesbian mothers in custody disputes have found that they are forced to deny pride in their
lesbian sexuality and to appear part of the mainstream. They must enter the courtroom armed with
empirical evidence that heterosexual and lesbian mothers have similar sex-role behavior and attitudes
towards child-rearing. "[Wihen we constantly assert in the public arena that we will raise our chil-
dren to be heterosexual, and that we will protect them from manifestations of our sexuality and from
the larger lesbian and gay community, we lose something that affects all lesbian and gay men. We
essentially concede that it is preferable to be heterosexual, thereby foreclosing an assertion of pride
and of the positive value in homosexuality." Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families: Legal Ob-
stacles, Legal Challenges, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 907, 908-09 (1986).
13. See Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal
Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 111, 127 (1987) [here-
inafter Difference] ("Some governmental actions imposing differential treatment on the basis of group
differences will survive the searching inquiry of rights analysis; yet, rights analysis itself does not
explain why.").
14. Id. at 124. Professor Minow asserts that rights analysis is only dubious of classification when
there has been a history of prejudice; the class is hence inherently "suspect." Id. Traditional equal
protection has proved successful for blacks and others deemed members of a suspect class; their differ-
ence then becomes an "irrelevant accident" to which "Justice must be blind." Tussman & tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 353 (1949). Homosexuals have fared less
well, in part because there is scant evidence of their history of overt discrimination and political
underrepresentation. "A minority must exist before it can be oppressed, but a socially-defined, self-
conscious homosexual minority simply does not exist very far back in the nations's past." D'Emilio,
Making and Unmaking Minorities: The Tensions Between Gay Politics and History, 14 N.Y.U REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 915, 920 (1986).
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Difference is intelligible only as a statement of relationship; rather than
intrinsic, difference is a social construct designed to confirm superiority. 5
Judges, therefore, both create and defeat equality from a relation of power
to the differences they construct." When those possessing the power to set
the norm are heterosexual, they easily classify homosexuals as the deviant
"other" to justify the unequal burdens homosexuals bear, including their
confinement "to the closet." Because judges embed their unstated white,
heterosexual male point of comparison in categories and labels, differences
appear neutral, inevitable and true. To percieve an "other" is an ontologi-
cal weapon, 7 however, wielded by those with the power to claim the
"true" perspective and ignore the multiplicity of "other" perspectives. Ul-
timately, this weapon disembodies the "other" and renders her suffering
invisible.
B. The Snare of Rule-Bound Doctrine
To determine whether state statutes defining marriage as "a union of
man and woman" violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a court will initially become mired in confusion over which
"tier of scrutiny" should apply. It must determine whether the class ex-
cluded from the right is suspect or non-suspect,18 and whether the right at
issue is fundamental or not,19 in order to decide whether to examine the
15. Minow, Difference, supra note 13, at 128-29; Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 6, at
35-36. The disjunction between self and "other" contains the seeds of domination, see Scales, supra
note 6, at 1382,-of male over female, straight over gay, public over private, and market over family.
16. Minow,Justice Engendered, supra note 6, at 13-15. Feminist scholars have come to discover
that when men postulate "a self-referential standard as the objectively inclusive norm," women are
hard-pressed in their fight for equality. Finley, supra note 7, at 1152-59. See Scales, supra note 6, at
1377-78. The association of the masculine perception with the rational self has led to the hierarchical
interpretation of masculine principles as superior to the inferior principles of the feminine "other."
See Whitbeck, A Different Reality: Feminist Ontology, in BEYOND DOMINATION: NEW PERaSPEC-
TIVES ON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 67 (C. Gould ed. 1983).
17. Moi, supra note 1.
18. With the exception of the short-lived ruling in Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428
(9th Cir. 1987), nullified on June 8, 1988 and expected to be reversed en banc in early 1989, homo-
sexuals have not been regarded as an inherently suspect class, particularly in the wake of Hardwick.
See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("It would be quite anomolous, on its face,
to declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause."). Thus unless a court takes into consideration the creative
arguments in Watkins, it need not deliberate at length on this prong of the test.
19. The question whether marriage is a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny may generate
dispute. In Loving v. Virginia, although the Court could have declared Virginia's miscegenation stat-
ute prohibiting interracial marriage unconstitutional solely on the basis of an invidious racial classifi-
cation violative of the equal protection clause, it recognized the "freedom of choice to marry" as a
fundamental liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it is "one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Loving, 388 U.S.
1, 12.
In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court confirmed the right to marry as one of "fundamental importance
for all individuals." 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978). In the equal protection analysis that ensued, Justice
Marshall invoked his unique "sliding scale" formulation of equal protection: "When a statutory clas-
sification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it
is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests." Id. at 388. There was division in Zablocki as to whether this approximation of strict scru-
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legislation in question with "strict," "heightened," or "minimum"
scrutiny.20
Under the minimal scrutiny of rational relations test, courts in previous
homosexual marriage challenges have taken a traditional deferential
stance and accepted the state's construction of marriage as having the dual
purposes of fostering procreation and traditional morality, thereby defeat-
ing the single-gender marriage challenge.
2 1
Requiring that exclusionary classifications merely be "rationally re-
lated" to a state interest largely results in an abdication of judicial re-
view.2 2 A court may avoid explanation and circumvent responsibility by
deferring to a government's avowed purpose.23 There need be no search-
ing examination of the legitimacy of the state's purpose in maintaining
marriage as a heterosexual privilege or of majoritarian moral sentiments
regarding homosexuality.2 Nor need the court articulate with any preci-
sion the moral objectives the marriage classification serves.
Though the tiered analysis is intended to be a procedural approxima-
tiny should be followed. The Justices differed widely as to the proper intensity of review in accor-
dance with their evaluation of the fundamental nature of the right at stake. The hesitation to apply
strict scrutiny may have been due to the fact that it has been "'strict' in theory . . . [but] fatal in
fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). Such strict
scrutiny might essentially put marriage beyond the government's reach and erase a history of state
control. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877).
Animosity towards homosexual relationships may lead a court to deny the fundamental nature of
the right to marry as applied to lesbian and gay couples. It may interpret narrowly the marital right
according to its tradition as the monogamous union of a man and woman for the purposes of procrea-
tion and child-rearing, feeling less inclined to take an expansive approach to it because the fundamen-
tal right to marry has no direct textual support in the Constitution. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194
("The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.").
20. The level of review determines how narrow the "fit" must be between legislative ends and
means; that is, whether the state interests advanced in support of the exclusionary classification must
be "compelling," "sufficiently important," or merely "rational". See generally Tussman & tenBroek,
supra note 14.
21. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), and Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash.
App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974), upheld state marriage statutes excluding homosexuals under rational
relations tests, relying on the inextricable link between marriage and procreation to justify differential
treatment of homosexual couples whose union poses the "impossibility of reproduction." Singer, 522
P.2d at 1195. The Baker court acknowledged that the state does not impose on heterosexual couples
the condition that they are willing and able to procreate, but it dismissed this argument by asserting
that "the classification is no more than theoretically imperfect." Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187 (citation
omitted). This Note assumes that courts will also dismiss the argument that artificial technology and
surrogate motherhood now enable single-gender couples to procreate-that is, that courts will still be
wed to traditional notions of procreation.
22. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 19, at 8.
23. See Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 6, at 83-86 (deference and reliance on doctrinal
boundaries may preempt questions or exempt reason-giving).
24. Because sexual orientation has not been considered a suspect classification, the government
has not been forced to elucidate its morality interest underlying legislation discriminating against
homosexuals. See Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1305 (1985). Subjecting Georgia's sodomy statute to the test
of rationality, the Court in Hardwick, with no discussion or explanation, asserted that it simply did
not agree that "majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared inade-
quate." 478 U.S. at 196.
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tion of equal protection of the laws, the formalism of the process obscures
the right shaping its contours.25 The term "equality" is noticeably absent
from these multi-leveled tests. If justification of exclusion is to be taken
seriously, however, primary allegiance should be to the constitutional
mandate of equality, not to an incoherent and "rudderless" procedure.26
By translating the equal protection ideal into a proliferation of rules
and classifications, the judiciary has created a guise for its power, ena-
bling it to avoid responsibility for perpetuating the inequities experienced
by the "other." The language of equal protection is its instrument of de-
ception.27 Just as the reliance on "controlling" precedent implies that the
legal process yields results of its own accord,28 the language of tests and
fidelity to rules allow the decisionmaker to avoid the moral dimensions
and painful consequences of decisions.29 Rational rules with universal ap-
plication promise certainty and suppress emotion. The labels and catego-
ries used to classify individuals are "masks" behind which humanity is
hidden and disavowed.30 When those masks obfuscate the substantive
right to equality, the judiciary fails to live up to its role. 1 Though the
rules may be abstract, the victims of power are not. Masks embodying the
power to proclaim difference foster inhuman neglect and merciless
conformity.
II. EMPATHY-A TOOL To STRETCH THE MORAL IMAGINATION
Justice, if "blind," provides the illusion of simplicity, certainty and om-
nipotent truth-and obscures the pain engendered by not seeing. The fail-
ure of equal protection may rest, in part, on the myopia of the masculine
moral vision hindering our commitment to equality. The feminist quest is
to restore judicial vision and compel the courts to respond meaningfully to
inequality. The tool to open the eyes of the judiciary is empathy, a femi-
25. See Scales, supra note 6, at 1385 ("[Feminism] is vitally concerned with the oblivion fostered
by lawyers' belief that process is what matters.").
26. See Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term -Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977) ("Surely we are near the point of maximum
incoherence of equal protection doctrine."); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 321 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding the Court's approach to equal protection "rud-
derless, . . . giving no firm guidance to judges").
27. Cf Stark, Why Lauyers Can't Write, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1389, 1390 (1984) ("Language...
limits what lawyers can see.").
28. See Minow,Justice Engendered, supra note 6, at 35, 85 (noting that focus on precedent leads
a court repeatedly to assign sameness and difference, yet it pretends that such an assignment is beyond
its control); Stark, supra note 27, at 1391.
29. See Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1590 (1987). But see Wat-
kins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1452 (9th Cir. 1987) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("[Bound
by precedent], I am sometimes compelled to reach a result I believe to be contrary to the proper
interpretation of constitutional principles. This is regrettably one of those times.").
30. J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF "HE LAw 19-20 (1976).
31. "[Tlhe judge who has forgotten the purpose of justice is almost surely masked." Id. at 21.
Line-drawing and categorizing too often "closes our eyes to basic reasons for constitutional shelter."
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 203 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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nine lens absent from the rights-based legal domain. By connecting
imaginitively with the human dimension of social inequities, the judiciary
may bring law back from the plane of abstraction to its purpose: resolving
moral dilemmas-on human, not just legal terms.32 In the process, they
may discover that the notion of equality is in need of expansion.33
A. Two Moral Voices-Two Moral Visions
Justice without question has a moral dimension. The studies of devel-
opmental psychologist Carol Gilligan on gender difference in moral devel-
opment have thus inspired feminist legal scholars to ponder the conse-
quences of the exclusion of women's point of view from the creation of
law and the administration of justice.3 ' Many conclude that the existing
male-dominated jurisprudence distorts the fundamental tension between
autonomy and connection, individual and community, and rules and eq-
uity, privileging the former over the latter.3 5 The recognition that there
are two contexts for moral decision-justice and care-makes judgment by
definition contextually relative and may lead the judiciary to a new under-
standing of responsibility and choice.36
In her studies, Professor Gilligan observed that girls and boys use two
different ethics to solve moral dilemmas. 7 These two orientations generate
distinct but related moral injunctions-not to treat others unfairly, and
32. See Dubois, Dunlap, Gilligan, MacKinnon & Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Discourse, Moral
Values and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REv. I1, 51 (1985) [hereinafter Conversa-
tion]; Scales, supra note 6, at 1387.
33. Listening to neglected human voices may demonstrate that a legal principle or decision is
deficient and needs to be changed to "comport with a just ordering of human voices." Yudof, "Tea at
the Palaz of Hoon": The Human Voice in Legal Rules. 66 TEX. L. REv. 589, 611 (1988).
34. See, e.g., Finley, supra, note 7; Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotia-
tion: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984); Scales, supra note 6; Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986).
35. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 7, at 1177; Sherry, supra note 34, at 580-82.
36. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 9, at 166.
37. Each ethic originates in the young child's awareness of his self in relation to others. See
Gilligan & Wiggins, The Origins of Morality in Early Childhood Relationships 4 (November, 1985)
(unpublished manuscript available in Yale Law School Library). Because masculinity is defined
through separation and individuation, boys tend to view the autonomy of individuals as the paramount
value of our moral universe. They perceive moral problems as the result of conflicting and competing
rights, belonging to the self and to the "other," which require hierarchical "rules" for their resolution.
The rules formulating an "ethic of justice" or "ethic of rights" allow for a winner and a loser in a
logical although abstract fashion, transcending the immediacy of the conflict at hand. See N.
CHODOROw, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
GENDER 166-68 (1978); C. GILLIGAN, supra note 9, at 25-51.
Femininity, on the other hand, is defined through identification and attachment. Because female
ontology does not define by negation, "relationships between people are understood as developing
through identification and differentiation, through listening and speaking, with each other, rather
than through struggles to dominate or annihilate the other." Whitbeck, supra note 16, at 76. See N.
CHODOROW, supra, at 166-68. The experience of attachment underlies the conception of morality as
love, the need to respond to another. Gilligan & Wiggins, supra, at 5. Girls' understanding of moral-
ity arises from the recognition of relationships, the belief in communication as the best way to resolve
conflict, and the conviction that compelling representation of dilemmas will bring about resolution. C.
GILLIGAN, supra, at 30. Guided by an "ethic of responsibility" or "ethic of care," girls tend to
devalue rules that interfere with the preservation of relationships. Id. at 10, 44.
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not to turn away from others in need. Though their resulting decisions
may converge, the two methodologies are in fundamental tension with one
another. From the justice perspective, detachment is necessary to define
transcendent rights. In the framework of care, such lack of connection is
perceived as a grave moral danger.8 Ultimately, the integrity of each
mode requires their interconnection, for "[a]bandonment of the rules pro-
duces monsters; so does neglect of persons."3"
Most people, male and female, speak in both the voice of justice and the
voice of care when describing moral conflict.40 Out of the desire to reduce
ambiguity and arrive at certainty, however, a majority of people focus on
one language or the other, typically according to their gender."' The mas-
culine voice of rights has dominated legal discourse.
Through the feminine moral lens, traditional equal protection analysis
is morally "underinclusive." The more controversy generated over the tier
of scrutiny and the nature of the right, the further a court is removed
from context and connection, from the integration of justice and care. To
avoid social change and perpetuate the status quo subjecting homosexual
relationships to segregation and hiding, a court need only proclaim to the
single-gender couple seeking equal protection for their fundamental right
to marry, "You are different." Its voice, however, will be muffled in
obfuscation, necessary to shield the pain of abandoning the "other."
B. The Myopic Judicial Vision of Homosexual Relationships
The Supreme Court grievously illustrated the oppressive consequences
of the myopic masculine discourse in Hardwick. The Court's assumption
of the opposition of homosexuality and the family42 promoted a "willful
blindness:"'43 the failure to question the validity of the assumption and its
consequences. Though the lack of connection at first blush appears "natu-
ral," for by their sexual union homosexuals cannot procreate, the Court
failed to acknowledge that only state prohibitions-legal constructs-bar
homosexuals from marrying and raising families.44 Such blindness rein-
38. See Gilligan & Wiggins, supra note 37, at 14.
39. J. NOONAN, supra note 30, at 18.
40. See Gilligan & Wiggins, supra note 37, at 39.
41. See id. at 10-11.
42. The Court denied homosexuals' right to engage in private consensual sexual conduct largely
because of the majority's misguided belief that there is "[nlo connection between family, marriage or
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other ...... Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191
(distinguishing other cases upholding an individual's right to privacy).
43. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to majority's failure to recognize sexual inti-
macy as central relationship of human existence).
44. When socially or legally constructed differences are viewed as natural, and hence legitimate,
they are all too often immunized from searching examination by the Court. See Kronman, Alexander
Bickel's Philosophy ofJurisprudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1603 (1985) ("The temptation to place the
moral foundations of society in a pre-existing state of nature reflects the powerful wish to give one's
favored scheme of values a precision and unconditional legitimacy that put it safely beyond the realm
of political controversy."); Minow, Difference, supra note 13, at 173 ("we use stereotypes to structure
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forces the "naturalness" of the stereotype of homosexuality as antithetical
to family values."'
If the Court's starting point for analysis had been the recognition of the
interrelation between sexual intimacy, love, relationships and the family,
rather than a blind stereotype, perhaps the majority would not have dis-
missed the claim to privacy so blithely or left unexamined the presumed
immorality of homosexual activity. Reality belies the myth of homosexuals
as aberrant loners who bear no relation to the tenderness associated with
marriage and the family. Only a pathological twist of the social memory
forgets that homosexuals are born into and raised by families. If the Court
would only recognize this-if it would make the connection-perhaps it
would better understand that, like heterosexuals, homosexuals desire the
warmth and security of intimate relationships created by marriage and the
family. The human proclivity for forming traditional family bonds is
deeply socially ingrained and not dependent on sexual orientation.
Why is it that a majority of the Court failed to see beyond the stereo-
types that prevent homosexuals from gaining access to their basic civil
rights? The Justices probably viewed sodomy between same gender
couples with such distaste, if not revulsion, that they failed to see that
from the viewpoint of homosexual couples, at least those who desire to
pledge themselves to one another in marriage, these sexual acts may be
the most "natural" expressive acts of love and care. Only in the eyes of
the heterosexual beholder, who possesses the power to attribute difference,
is sodomy performed by members of the same sex "unnatural." This dis-
torted vision of Hardwick is, in part, endemic to constitutional jurispru-
dence. Because the Court need never "connect" with the party seeking
redress on appeal, but need only think in terms of the anonymous "indi-
vidual" in a rule-bound game, it may avoid emotional reciprocity and "the
moral crux of the matter in real human situations.""' The reliance on
stereotype reflects, above all, the failure of empathic imagination-the
failure to imagine the perspective of the "other."
the world, localize anxieties and lend appearances of legitimacy and self-evident truth to what we
have invented").
45. The view of homosexuality as the negation of the family has led courts to perceive the very
concept of "homosexual parents" as an oxymoron. See, e.g., In Re Davis, 1 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA)
2845, 2846 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1975) ("Substituting two male homosexuals for 'parents' does violence
not only to the literal definition of who are parents but offends the traditional concept of what a
family is."); see also B. MADDOX, MARRIED AND GAY (1982) (discussing societal prejudice against
homosexual parenthood).
46. Scales, supra note 6, at 1387; see Henderson, supra note 29, at 1639 ("Mr. Hardwick never
appeared in the briefs or arguments as a human being. . . . He became another disembodied person
onto whom fears, prejudices, and false beliefs could be projected.").
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C. The Promise of Imagination: Revealing the Invisible
Objectivity need not spell insensitivity. It may be redefined to require
only disengagement from the immediacy of personal desire and values,
rather than the negation of care altogether."' Judgment requires the free
exercise of the moral imagination to enable the adjudicator to identify
with the party before him and suspend his own cultural beliefs.48 If the
judiciary is to meet its responsiblity as moral arbiter under the ethic of
care, it must attempt to understand dilemmas of inequality from the per-
spective of the party seeking redress.
In order for the Court to one day step into the shoes of a homosexual
couple pursuing the fundamental right to marry, the Justices must de-
velop a "humane imagination," the facility to recognize humanity in peo-
ple who are different.49 Granted, it takes courage to approach the subject
of homosexuality "with open minds rather than fixed certainties, with
hearts full of compassion rather than repugnance."50 But we do not expect
less from the judiciary than principled fortitude in upholding equal pro-
tection of the law and other constitutional guarantees. Stretching the
moral imagination is a question of willpower;5" empathy is the tool to
accomplish it.52 By bringing the "other's" perspective to the forefront,
feminism seeks to confront the assignment of difference by the judicial
"self"-and pull the judiciary into the web of humanity.53 Empathy
47. Although the Court should hesitate before imposing its own value choices, the goal of objectiv-
ity should not paralyze the Court, preventing it from considering collective goals such as equality and
values held by those seeking access to protected rights. Impartiality, after all, is only a mask: "The
idea of impartiality implies human access to a view beyond human experience, a 'God's eye' point of
view. Not only do humans lack this inhuman perspective, but humans who claim it are untruthful
.. " Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 6, at 75.
48. See Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 792-94 (1983)
(likens task of moral decisionmaker to anthropologist who enters imaginatively into tribe's own world
and sees it from within).
49. See C. BLACK, JR., The Humane Imagination in the Great Society, in THE HUMANE IMAGI-
NATION 4 (1986) (the "humane imagination" is "the imagination of the feeling and believing and
knowing inwardnesses of others" which must be continually tuned and retuned "by checking it
against clues in language and behavior"); Gilligan & Wiggins, supra note 37, at 14. ("[A] more fluid
conception of the self in relation to others is tied to the growth of affective imagination, the ability to
enter into and understand through experiencing the feelings of others.").
50. W.S. COFFIN, THE COURAGE TO LOVE 40 (1982).
51. Discussing the failure of sex equality, Professor Black has written that "the main ingredient
in the pathology of imagination has been lack of male will to try rightly to imagine women, with an
extremely large component of a corrupt desire to believe such fantasies about women as would justify
the abuses." C. BLACK, supra note 49, at 6.
52. Empathy captures three phenomena: feeling the emotion of another; understanding, both af-
fectively and cognitively, the experience of another, often by imagining oneself to be in the position of
the other; and action brought about by experiencing the distress of another. Henderson, supra note
29, at 1579.
53. The adjudicator may be less certain about difference when there is occassion for connection.
Fiction is one source of empathic connection for it has the power to activate the "humane imagina-
tion" by calling upon the reader to imagine the inwardness, feelings and distress of a person not
known to exist. C. BLACK, supra note 49, at 8-9. Perhaps if Justice White had read David Leavitt's
FAMILY DANCING he would have been moved to agree with Justice Blackmun in Hardwick that
privacy protection is necessary to homosexuals' personal freedom because homosexuality inheres in the
"very fiber" of personhood. In "Territory," Leavitt sensitively portrays a young gay man's under-
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promises to force an adjudicator to recognize that his own point of view is
not the only truth, but merely one among a continuum." The awareness
of multiple truths relativizes equality in the direction of equity, fusing
justice with care. 5 Although the imagination has the negative power to
block connection through the creation of stereotypes,56 the "humane imag-
ination" promises to be a positive source of change and understanding. 7
In the care framework, the correct moral response depends on the con-
text .5  Fairness can only be determined with reference to social reality and
the human predicament.5 A full examination of the context of the homo-
sexual marriage challenge may illustrate not only why justice demands
equal protection of fundamental rights, but also how human needs when
fully felt may summon response from the courts. The following narrative
is intended to develop the context, engage the empathic imagination and
reveal the invisible.60
A PORTRAIT OF A FAMILY
After eight years of living together and caring for one another, Abby
and Karen have formed a deep emotional attachment. 1 Three years ago
they exchanged private vows of lifetime commitment and rings, as symbols
standing and confession of his sexuality:
Neil finally stood in the kitchen, his back turned to his parents, and said, with unexpected
ease, "I'm a homosexual." The words seemed insufficient, reductive. For years he had believed
his sexuality to be detachable from the essential him, but now he realized that it was part of
him. He had the sudden, despairing sensation that though the words had been easy to say, the
fact of their having been aired was incurably damning.
D. LEAVITT, FAMILY DANCING 7 (1984).
54. See Henderson, supra note 29, at 1653.
55. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 9, at 166.
56. The power of stereotypes to block connection must not be underestimated. Even the parents of
homosexual children yield to stereotypes' strength, until, for some, the vigor of love counteracts their
influence. "Stereotypes shun logic and reason and at least temporarily can block the natural flow of
parental affections. But the primal instinct to love and protect one's young, however latent, embodies
an immense potential for social reform." Bernstein, My Daughter is a Lesbian, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24,
1988 at A27, col.l.
57. See Minow, Difference, supra note 13, at 173 (Critical social theories attempt to show "how
what seems natural in the world is so often the construction of human imagination and that human
imagination could itself bring about change.").
58. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 9, at 38.
59. See Scales, supra note 6, at 1380.
60. This narrative is a fictional composite portrait of a number of homosexual couples I spoke
with during the formative stages of the Note. It is only one example of the homosexual family and is
not intended to obscure the differences within the lesbian and gay community, including varying reac-
tions to the entire notion of homosexual marriage. The personal narrative style is intended to inter-
rupt and confront the objectivity of theory. My hope is that by painting a picture rather than solely
reporting stark empirical facts, my audience may begin to connect imaginatively with hypothetical
claimants to the right to marry-to discern their faces-although the reader can never truly feel the
need for equal protection as experienced by those who lack it.
61. Contrary to the myth of promiscuity, a high percentage of lesbians and gay men live with life
partners in de facto marriages, in many cases for decades. Single-gender couples share the same prin-
cipal concerns as heterosexual couples, including equity, loyalty, stability, intimacy and love. See Brief
of American Psychological Association and American Public Health Association at 13-15, Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
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of their bond. In adopting a common last name, the couple sought to
transform their identities- from separate individuals to a mutually and
publicly defined union. Abby and Karen felt that without the commitment
to the endurance of their love, their relationship would be too vulnerable
in the face of the societal forces pulling them apart. Far too often, they
have been subjected to painful, obscene jeers-and worse-while strolling
down the street. The knowledge that they will always be there for each
other has increased their hopes for sustained happiness and has enhanced
their sense of personal worth and self-respect.
Shortly after their private ceremony, the couple inquired into the possi-
bility of adoption or artificial insemination. 2 Because they felt strongly
about the experience of pregnancy, Abby and Karen opted to utilize the
new reproductive technology that would enable them to bear children
outside of the heterosexual union. A year ago, Abby gave birth to a son,
Nicholas. Karen now hopes that with the impending birth of her child,
her parents will begin to acccept her relationship with Abby.6
Though this family is happy and self-sufficient, in many ways it is
handicapped by the lack of state recognition. Absent the official sanction
of matrimony, the community need not accept Abby and Karen's relation-
ship as legitimate and hence deserving of respect. In addition, Abby and
Karen are denied the significant economic and legal rewards granted to
married couples because of the marital relationship's presumed contribu-
tion to social stability.6" The state's refusal to extend the right of marriage
to Abby and Karen has deprived them of access to the judical forum, not
only to protect their property interests in the event of dissolution,65 but
also to protect their dual parent-child relationship. Karen has no enforce-
able rights or responsibilities to Nicholas, her psychological child.66
Should Nicholas suffer an injury at school when Abby is away on busi-
62. As of 1981, 1.5 million lesbian mothers were living with natural children and a high percent-
age of them are raising their children with a lesbian partner. See Comment, Second Parent Adoption
for Lesbian-Parented Families: Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 729,
732 n.12, 741 n.62 (1986). Psychological research reveals that gay and lesbian parents provide their
children with healthy home environments. These children do not exhibit more emotional problems
than do children of heterosexual couples, nor do they experience any more difficulty with gender
identity. See Comment, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: To-
ward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 882 & n.192 (1985).
63. It is not uncommon that parents cannot bring themselves to accept their homosexual child's
relationship. Several homosexuals I spoke with attribute this to a parental sense of failure as child-
rearers. See also Bernstein, supra note 56. Parents of homosexual children also express to them their
disappointment that the children will not carry on their traditions-that is, they will not marry and
raise families. The recognition of homosexual marriage does not promise better relations between
homosexual couples and their families, but at least it might diminish the friction engendered by the
hostile stance of the law.
64. These rewards include income tax, employment, insurance and health care benefits; intestate
succession; spousal testimonial privileges; support and visitation rights; and familial authority in medi-
cal emergencies. See Ingram, supra note 4, at 36; Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the
Mid-Eighties, Part II, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 383 (1986).
65. See Rivera, supra note 64, at 325-327.
66. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 1.0413] (R. Achtenberg ed. 1987).
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ness, Karen will have no authority to consent to emergency surgery. If
Abby and Karen's relationship should fall apart, Abby would have every
right to deprive Karen of her relationship with Nicholas. On the other
hand, Karen would not be obliged to contribute towards his support. By
withholding the legal protection of marriage, the law denies a relationship
that exists for Nicholas and ignores his interests in the security of two
parents. Though bound by love to the emotional and financial responsibil-
ities of parenthood, Abby and Karen have no legal protection should that
love fade.67
To overcome their legal disabilities, Abby and Karen explored alterna-
tives to marital benefits: adult adoption, second parent adoption, domestic
partnership benefits, palimony contracts and parenting contracts. These
alternatives offer incomplete remedies and their legal enforceability is
open to question in most jurisdictions."8 More importantly, such options
cannot provide the psychological benefits of state-blessed marriage: the en-
hanced respectability of the loving relationship and its acceptance in the
wider community. 69 Abby and Karen too often feel compelled to conceal
their family, to protect it from the harsh gaze of those who perceive it as
immoral. They worry that Nicholas may suffer the ruthless taunts and
teasing of other children because his family is different.70 And though the
legal protection of marriage might not insulate their son from prejudice, at
least he would know that his mothers' relationship is not immoral in the
eyes of the law.
Because the legislature in this heterosexist society does not even ac-
knowledge the existence of homosexual couples,7 1 the courts must respond
67. Courts will inevitably encounter the offspring of these unions, however. In the interest of
equity, some have already begun to extend protection. See, e.g., Loftin v. Flournoy, No. 569630-7
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 1985) (psychological parent granted standard visitation rights to child of her
lover following "divorce" of lesbian couple); In re Adoption of M. by S. & A., No. d8503-61930 (Or.
Ct. App. Sept. 4, 1985) (psychological parent of lesbian lover's child allowed to adopt as "second
parent"). Legal recognition of these families remains the exception to the rule, however.
68. See SEXUAL ORIETrATION AND THE LAW, supra note 66, §§ 1.02-.05,1.04, 2.04, 3.04; Ri-
vera, supra note 64, at 324-398. But see In re N.L.D. and D.J.H., No. 17945 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb.
24, 1986) (first joint adoption granted to lesbian couple).
69. See Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection
and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 101 (1967) ("To be treated as a full member
of the society is to be accepted as an equal in the public life of the community."); Glendon, Marriage
and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663, 685 (1976) (marriage, as
opposed to cohabitation, provides "attestation to the relevant community").
70. Though the children of single-gender couples may be subject to community intolerance, this is
not a valid reason to deny homosexuals the right to parent or the right to marry. "The Constitution
cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429, 433 (1984) (custody could not be denied to interracial couple on basis that child would be subject
to pressures and stresses of prejudice not present if child were living with parents of same racial
origin); see also M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 438, 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (1979) (threat of
community intolerance insufficient to deny custody to lesbian mother).
71. In Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988), Judge Norris attributed
the improbability of political redress for homosexuals to lack of empathy and gays' invisibility:
[M]any of us, including many elected officials, are likely to have difficulty understanding or
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meaningfully to the deprivation of their basic civil rights such as marriage.
Members of the judiciary must open their eyes to segments of humanity
shielded from their view and listen to the voices of those, like Abby and
Karen, appealing to them for the equal protection of laws essential to the
preservation of their relationships. The mechanistic approach of tradi-
tional analysis only perpetuates their silence. By immersing itself in the
jungle of doctrinal rules, the judiciary can ignore what is hidden and hide
what it wants to ignore. In utilizing empathy to expand their reasoning to
include emotion and experience as well as rights, judges may find that
when they care about justice they are compelled to act-to rethink equal-
ity in human terms.7
III. TOWARDS A RICHER VISION OF EQUALITY
The single-gender marriage challenge demonstrates the need for an
ideal of equality sensitive to the problem of detachment, considered a sign
of injustice under the ethic of care. The feminine vision suggests that the
substantive right to equality is an individual's affirmative right to connec-
tion to and response from the community.73 If responsibilities to others
constitute the underpinnings of morality, then the duties of response and
protection must have a place in our vision of equality. The equal protec-
tion clause confers more than the right to be treated with equal concern
and respect; it encompasses the right to be included.74 Equal protection
empathizing with homosexuals. Most people have little exposure to gays, both because they
rarely encounter gays and because the gays they do encounter feel compelled to conceal their
sexual orientation. In fact, the social, economic, and political pressures to conceal one's homo-
sexuality commonly deter many gays from openly advocating pro-homosexual legislation, thus
intensifying their inability to make effective use of the political process.
837 F.2d at 1447.
72. Rather than simply add a new prong to an already multi-pronged, incoherent procedure, the
feminist impulse is to start de novo, with a fresh canvas and an expansive imagination. This does not
mean that the "mediating principles" suggested here cannot be integrated with existing doctrine; on
the contrary, approaches such as Marshall's sliding scale that emphasize contextual decisionmaking
accord with these principles. See Minow, Difference, supra note 13, at 136.
73. Feminist scholars have made other proposals to redefine equality. See, e.g., C. MAcKINNON,
supra note 7, at 101-27 (proposing an "inequality" approach requiring courts to strike down policies
contributing to the maintenance of an underclass or deprived position because of gender status);
Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 436 (1981) (equality means to cease to
impose upon women a bifurcated existence and to restore their opportunity to live a continuous life).
Professor Minow's "social relations" approach to equality suggests two judicial strategies for analysis
similar to those proposed in this Note-taking the perspective of the group defined as different and
exploring the social meanings that exclusion carries in a community. Minow, Difference, supra note
13, at 127-30. However, Minow's standard for equality focuses more on relations of power: "Attribu-
tions of difference should be sustained only if they do not express or confirm the distribution of power
in ways that harm the less powerful and benefit the more powerful." Id. at 128.
74. The claim that equal protection compels the right to inclusion is not unique to this Note.
Other commentators, however, do not derive the right from the feminine approach to solving moral
dilemmas of inequality. See, e.g., Fiss, Groups and tke Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 107, 147-77 (1976) (equality doctrine should prohibit conduct that disadvantages groups from
full participation in society); Karst, supra note 26, at 4 (core of equal protection clause is principle of
equal citizenship: "the right to be treated as a respected, responsible and participating member");
Minow, Difference, supra note 13, at 189 ("the prerequisite 'sameness' [is] the shared 'right' to be
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thus imposes upon the state a positive duty of intervention to protect indi-
viduals' attachment to the community.7" As applied to the homosexual
marriage challenge, this ideal of equality mandates that if marriage is a
primary unit of community and that community strives to treat all indi-
viduals with equal care, then homosexuals have an equal right to establish
a connection to the community as a whole through the institution of
marriage.
Under the ethic of care, human rights7 6 are claims upon societal institu-
tions that must be honored in order for each individual to meet the re-
sponsibilities of his or her fundamental relationships.7 The more a cer-
tain inequality threatens to damage a key relationship, the greater the
necessity of judicial intervention to adjust rules and demand state action.
Homosexuals' claim upon the state to the right to marry is necessitated by
the need for equal treatment with respect to the state benefits and protec-
tion that enable couples to meet their mutual responsibilities to an inti-
mate relationship and promote their inclusion in the community.
To make this ideal of equality meaningful, the Court will have to make
connections: connections to the human experience of inequality from the
perspective of previously unheard and unseen claimants, 7  and connections
between the right at stake and how it operates in the community to fur-
ther equality. The Court must also be willing to expand and redefine a
included"); Sherry, supra note 34, at 593 ("anti-discrimination values safeguard the individual's right
to belong to the community").
Certainly this was the underlying vision of equality in civil rights cases such as Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Perhaps this vision would have been all the more apparent if, rather
than categorizing such cases as "desegregation," they were given the more positive appellation of
"integration." The goal of the Court in Brown was to strengthen the national community by bringing
black and white children together. Through their connection, black and white children would begin to
understand and care for one another.
75. The state is not left without any power of exclusion. "[Ilt is not impossible both to empathize
with the suffering that often produces the sociopath and to accept the necessity of removing him or her
from society." Henderson, supra note 29, at 1584.
76. Though feminists have critiqued rights harshly, rights cannot be abandoned altogether. Not
only do they serve a protective function but they also have an important emotive value to the individ-
ual, for "to claim a right is to assert one's self-worth, to affirm one's moral value and entitlement."
Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REv. 387, 391 (1984).
77. See Whitbeck, supra note 16, at 80, 82. Unlike the rights view, the responsibilities view
cannot disregard the special responsibilities born of affectional relationships and the vast human suf-
fering that results from the denial of rights integral to those relationships. "[Rielationships between
people are what matter, and attributions of difference that build obstacles to such relationships are
suspect." Minow, Difference, supra note 13, at 136.
78. That is, the connection to Abby and Karen. Briefs and arguments in future constitutional
challenges will have to consciously place the empathic narrative within the legal framework. See Hen-
derson, supra note 29, at 1592. Professor Henderson suggests that empathy may be one of the keys to
successful Supreme Court litigation. The amicus brief of National Abortion Rights Action League,
excerpting letters from women who had had abortions, may have contributed to the recent reaffirma-
tion of Roe v. Wade in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). See
Henderson, supra, at 1635-38. Professor Minow notes that Justice Harlan may have been moved to
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), by Plessy's brief urging the Justices to imagine
themselves "with a black skin and curly hair. . . traveling through that portion of the country where
the 'Jim Crow Car' abounds. . . ." Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 6, at 59.
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particular right in accordance with its essential values and function 9
when that right is too narrowly conceived to include all those who need its
protection. Empathy and the ethic of care will not determine the outcome
of constitutional challenges to exclusion, but rather inform the balancing
undertaken. Utilizing empathy and the feminine moral vision to decide
questions of equality promises to yield better results in human terms.80
A. The Operation of the Right
Rather than focus on what state interests justify the selective applica-
tion of a right, under the feminine approach the Court would initially
examine the operation of the right in question and the effects of its denial
on those seeking access to it. The more the denial of a right furthers dis-
crimination and prevents attachment to the community, the greater the
governmental interest must be to justify that denial."' Homosexuals' in-
ability to marry directly contributes to the discrimination they encounter
in all realms of life because of the widespread belief that they are promis-
cuous sexual deviants. Because their relationship is the root of their exclu-
sion, state-sanctioned marriage is a core means of inclusion for homosexu-
als that the state may not deny without serious justification.
Though conceived and protected by the Court as a privacy right,82 mar-
riage operates essentially as a relational right: it enables individuals to
relate intimately to one another, and to the wider community.83 The pub-
lic function of marriage is particularly important to homosexual couples
seeking social acceptance of their relationships.84 Public expression of
commitment through marriage triggers recognition by and consequent
protection from the state, thus promoting a sense of belonging to the com-
munity through mutual public identification.
The public function and private values of marriage are in harmony
with one another. The state fosters the institution of marriage because
society benefits from the transmission of shared values of commitment,
79. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 946 (1978) (in asking whether an
alleged right forms part of a traditonal liberty, it is crucial "to define the liberty at a high enough
level of generality to permit unconventional variants to claim protection along with mainstream ver-
sions of protected conduct."). In his dissent in Hardwick, Justice Blackmun appeared to endorse the
idea of painting rights with a broad brush, in response to the values that engender them. 478 U.S. at
199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. "The strong claim for empathic understanding is that the moral decision, the moral result,
will be closer to the good than it otherwise would be." Henderson, supra note 29, at 1638.
81. See Karst, supra note 26, at 63 ("[T]he more that a particular inequality tends to stigmatize
or dehumanize its victims, or impair their ability to participate fully in the society, the more the
principle of equal citizenship demands justification in terms of a governmental interest of compelling
importance.").
82. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
83. If the Court applied feminist insights to its examination of the fundamental right to marry, it
would realize that, absent a focus on care, the right is incoherent. Both in its private and public
aspects, marriage is primarily about interconnection. Distilled to its fundamental values in the equal
protection context, marriage reveals certain characteristics obscured by the rubric of privacy.
84. See Note, supra note 24, at 1289-91.
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trust and responsibility into the broader community. 5 Vows of loyalty
lend stability and secure expectations both to the relationship and to soci-
ety. The community is strengthened not only by the potential happiness
and responsibility marriage generates, but also by the diversity of couples
who exchange marriage vows. 86 By making connections between marriage
and its function, the Court may find that the community only stands to
benefit from the increased social stability promised by the structured par-
ticipation of homosexuals in society through the institution of marriage."7
The denial of homosexuals' right to marry perpetuates their suffocation
in "the closet." From the feminine moral perspective, the isolation and
alienation of homosexuals enforced by a state-defined majoritarian moral-
ity is a harm in itself and deserving of redress.8" Such state-created de-
tachment renders homosexuality both deviant and unknown."
Ignorance leads some to mistakenly regard homosexuality as a matter of
acquired taste and, therefore, to penalize gays and lesbians for their per-
ceived deliberate "choice" of an immoral lifestyle.90 The overwhelming
psychiatric evidence demonstrates, however, that homosexuality is not a
matter of simple election but rather a deep-seated psycho-social phenome-
non established in early childhood years.9" Personal knowledge as well as
85. These values further citizenship in in a democratic state. See Hafen, The Constitutional Sta-
tus of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81
MICH. L. REV. 463, 479-484, 559 (1983).
86. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) (marriage and family
bonds foster diversity).
87. For example, state recognition of homosexual marriage may promote public health interests
by encouraging long-term monogomous relationships that reduce the threat of sexually transmitted
diseases, such as AIDS. The support obligations and clarification of rights that accompany marriage
would benefit the children of homosexual parents and may reduce the community's welfare burdens.
88. The state has isolated homosexuals from the community by depriving them not only of mar-
riage but also of connections to the professional work world, to government service and to the country
itself. See, e.g., Acanfora v. Board of Ed., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974) (transfer of openly homosex-
ual teacher upheld); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Navy regulation mandat-
ing discharge for homosexual conduct upheld); Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(aliens may be deported for having engaged in sodomy within five years of entry into United States).
89. The legal invisibility of single-gender relationships results largely from institutional heterosex-
ism, rather than from homophobia. Herek, The Social Psychology of Homophobia: Toward a Practi-
cal Theory, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 923, 925 (1986).
90. See Marmor, Overview: The Multiple Roots of Homosexual Behavior, in HOMOSEXUAL BE-
HAVIOR: A MODERN REAPPRAISAL 19 (J. Marmor ed. 1980); Warren, Homosexuality and Stigma,
in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra, at 125, 138. Such ignorance breeds fierce contempt and irra-
tional fear-the symptoms of homophobia. Though in its most pathological form homophobia stems
from a deep-seated insecurity about one's own sexuality and gender identity, the most prevalent source
of homophobic reactions is simple ignorance about homosexuality. See, e.g., Marmor, supra. Ulti-
mately, ignorance can provoke violence. The National Gay Task Force reports that in eight cities, one
out of five gay males and one out of ten lesbians have been punched, kicked, hit or beaten because
they are gay or lesbian. Brief Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project, et al., Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140) (reprinted in 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 953, 967 n.37
(1986)).
91. See Green, Patterns of Sexual Identity in Childhood. Relationship to Subsequent Sexual
Partner Preference, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 90; see also Baker v. Wade, 553 F.
Supp. 1121, 1131 n.19 (N.D. Tex. 1982) ("Sexual preference is fixed at an early age (probably
before age 6) . . . ."), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984); see generally C.A. TRIPP,
THE HOMOSEXUAL MATmIX (1975); D.J. WEsr, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED (1977). Since
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empirical evidence may be necessary to debunk the cruel stereotyping of
gays and lesbians as promiscuous sexual deviants. Through personal con-
tact with homosexuals, heterosexuals may be compelled, by the impulses
of care and response, to be more tolerant of difference." To a significant
degree, such understanding may take root only through communities' open
acceptance of homosexual couples.9 By recognizing homosexual relation-
ships in the public arena of marriage, the law may help to dismantle the
irrational fears and prejudice homosexuality elicits and enable single-
gender couples to lead lives of dignity and self-respect. 4
B. Community Resistance and Prioritizing Voices
Just as the Court cannot ignore homosexual couples' need for attach-
ment to the community under the feminine approach to inequality, the
Court also cannot ignore the community's resistance to that attachment, as
voiced through the State. The issue of homosexual marriage engenders
diverse reactions; one is hostility, rooted in the belief that homosexual re-
lationships are immoral.9" The connection between marriage and societal
recognition triggers the morality debate. If the immorality argument was
persuasive in Hardwick, where homosexuals claimed only the right to en-
gage in private sexual conduct free from state intrusion, it poses an even
graver barrier to homosexuals' claim to a legal status conferred by the
state as a benefit for conduct the state wants to encourage.
After scrutinizing the legitimacy of the majoritarian morality argu-
ment,9" the Court must decide if it is sufficiently compelling to justify the
nearly all young children are raised by heterosexual families, the popular myth that homosexuality is
"contagious" (a myth that impedes the acceptance of homosexuals in the public realm) is unfounded.
See Marmor, supra note 90, at 19-20.
92. Public opinion polls reveal that people who know at least one openly gay man or lesbian are
more likely than others to extend positive attitudes towards homosexuals as a group. But only about
30% of the American public claims to know openly gay people. See Herek, supra note 89, at 928.
93. See id. at 928.
94. I have no empirical proof that the legal sanction of marriage will open doors of understanding
for homosexuals in society. Yet my own musings on homosexual marriage began with personal expe-
rience, when my mother received a birth announcement from the lesbian daughter of an old friend.
Jessica had her baby Alexander by artificial insemination and she is raising him with Donna, her
lover of some years. The birth announcement and subsequent communications between my family and
Jessica's opened my eyes to an entire segment of our population hidden because of misunderstanding.
This family is the object of disgust to those who do not know its members firsthand. I am saddened
that we as a society are unwilling to recognize, much less lend support to, this loving family.
- The feminist method validates the personal experience of injustice as true evidence. "Consciousness
raising means that dramatic eye-witness testimony is being given; it means, more importantly, that
women now have the confidence to declare it as such. We have an alternative to relegating our percep-
tion to the realm of our own subjective discomfort." Scales, supra note 6, at 1402. See Conversation,
supra note 32, at 49-50 (Menkel-Meadow).
95. It may be difficult to actually gauge majoritarian sentiment as to the immmorality of homo-
sexuality. Twenty-five states have decriminalized homosexual sodomy in the past fifteen years.
96. The Court must critically examine the immorality issue, for too often morality is the veil for
prejudice, fear and religious values, see Veitch, The Essence of Marriage-A Comment on the Homo-
sexual Challenge, 5 ANGLo-AM. L. REv. 46 (1976), all of which cannot legitimize laws that selec-
tively abridge fundamental rights. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (prejudice against inter-
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exclusion of homosexual relationships from state protection.9" The Court
thus must determine which human voices count-those of couples like
Abby and Karen claiming access to a fundamental right, or those of com-
munity members offended by including such couples through the institu-
tion of marriage.98 The Fourteenth Amendment makes this seemingly on-
erous task easier, for, under its command, the judiciary must listen to
those competing voices with one ear tuned to the underlying value at
stake: equal protection. Empathy and care, therefore, inevitably connect
with rights and abstract principles to resolve these dilemmas.99 Though
the Justices may be tempted to avoid responsibility by turning to the "ma-
jority" for an answer when they are troubled by the decision of whether a
group may be excluded from constitutional protection, they may not do so
without offending the substantive core of the amendment. 00 Deference to
majoritarian morality must be tempered by equal protection principles.
The voices of the invisible-of those oppressed by inequality at the hands
of the majority-deserve priority.
This Note contends that under the expanded vision of equality, both the
principle of equal justice, insulating fundamental rights and equal access
to them from majoritarian domination,01 and the positive morality of
care, requiring the right to inclusion to preserve relationships, trump
moral orthodoxy. 0 2 From the perspective of the "other," a moral element
racial couple in custody context); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(fear of the mentally retarded); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (religious ban on teaching
evolution). The freedom to marry is partially granted to foster diversity and hence to reduce the fear
of intimate associations differing from the societal norm, like the interracial couple in Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Though Virginians in 1967 may have feared the acceptance of interracial
marriage, which was not only a legal but a deeply ingrained social taboo, such fear could not impede
the fundamental right to marry.
97. There is no escaping such difficult and often unpalatable value choices raised by equal protec-
tion challenges; under the feminist method, the Court must openly address them rather than disguise
them in tiers of scrutiny.
98. "The more decisionmakers try to listen to every human voice, the more they try to see events
from the perspective of every participant, the more they seek a complete understanding of the human
condition and perfect justice, the more difficult they will find it to apply legal rules and to assign
responsibility." Yudof, supra note 33, at 605.
99. Judge Wald asserts that "[a]lthough human voices can be heard on both sides of any legal
dispute, we ultimately are forced back to some abstract principle or value to compare, weigh and
choose between these human voices." Wald, Disembodied Voices- An Appellate Judge's Response,
66 TEX. L. REv. 623, 625 (1988). Interestingly, Judge Wald questions whether the advent of more
women on appellate courts will mean a greater emphasis on connections and caring-whether the
human voice and Carol Gilligan's "different voice" are "tonally related." Id. at 628. Gilligan herself
writes that "[t]o understand how the tension between reponsibilities and rights sustains the dialectic of
human development is to see the integrity of two disparate modes of experience that are in the end
connected." C. GILLIGAN, supra note 9, at 174.
100. The Fourteenth Amendment imposes an independent obligation of equal treatment on
majoritarian rule not to draw invidious distinctions among its citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment is
not value-neutral; it insists that the state presumptively treat individuals and relationships as members
who "belong," and that the Court be especially sensitive to those who upset the majority because of
their biological or deep psycho-social differences.
101. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote).
102. Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), supports this proposition. The widespread belief that interracial
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introduced by empathy, the "moral majority" is itself immoral: it threat-
ens to annihilate loving relationships. The morality of marriage is that of
caring and shared commitment: the mutual promise, induced by love, to
act responsibly towards one another. To be fully respected as members of
the community, homosexual couples must be treated as capable of taking
on that responsibility. 03
Perhaps there will come a time when we see that what turns any rela-
tionship-between man and woman, man and man, or between woman
and woman-into a moral one is the existence of love and devotion to one
another,1 ' and that the mode of expressing love is fundamentally a pri-
vate rather than a state concern. We will shield that love from the state's
judgment because the relationship at stake takes precedence over the pos-
sible offense the thought of certain expressions of love may cause to dis-
tant third parties." °
C. Expanding the Definition
The positive values associated with marriage, and its functional contri-
bution to community stability are not exclusive to the heterosexual rela-
tionship; nor does the transmission of values within a relationship, or into
the larger community, depend on gender opposition or sex-role stereo-
types. Though the traditional definition of marriage as the union of man
and woman has been a fixed star in the ever-changing constellation of the
family, that definition must change to render the fundamental right to
marry truly effective for all individuals regardless of sexual orientation.
To redefine marriage according to its essence as the union of two individ-
uals who publicly proclaim a mutual moral commitment to their deep
emotional bond, the Court need only expand its imagination to connect to
the immediacy of inequity experienced by homosexual couples.10 8
marriage was immoral could not justify an anti-miscegenation statute that was both invidiously dis-
criminatory and overly intrusive on the basic civil right to marry. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 221
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice;
neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.").
103. See Karst, supra note 26, at 9-10.
104. Discussing the range of reactions to a man and his gay lover, a psychologist noted: "It was
children, and mothers with children, who were the most understanding. One little girl, after visiting
the two men in their home, asked her mother, 'Do they love one another? Well, that's okay then."' B.
MADDOX, supra note 45, at 133.
105. The recognition of homosexual marriage will undoubtedly cause personal distress to some
public bystanders. Professor Buchanan opposes homosexual marriage, in part because it is "a highly
visible act" that enables a couple "to project their relationship into the daily walks of public life."
Buchanan, supra note 4, at 568. But such distress may not suffice to impede the exercise of individual
liberty. As with speech on a T-shirt that is vulgar, those who are offended by a homosexual couple
holding hands or kissing in public can "avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by
averting their eyes." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
106. Perhaps rights expand more easily when the Court can see inequality in context. The media
coverage of events like "Bloody Sunday" during the Civil Rights era forced the judiciary and the
populace to visually experience the suffering of children bruised and trampled during peaceful
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CONCLUSION
As the homosexual challenge to marry illustrates, differences among in-
dividuals may inhere, in part, in their relationships. The Court has cast
aside the pall of majoritarian orthodoxy when it threatens to condemn a
family, a marriage, or a way of life merely because it differs from the
social norm. 107 Thus, when fundamental relationships and rights thereto
have been endangered, the Court has preserved those relationships despite
their "difference" and adjusted definitions and rules accordingly.
10 8
Should the Court address the homosexual marriage challenge in the fu-
ture, it must listen with greater sensitivity to the existing but unspoken
feminine voice of care in the law, responsive to the human need for inti-
mate connections. Employing the tool of empathy with care may enable
the Court to understand that the fabric of society will not unravel in re-
sponse to homosexual marriage; rather, its threads will be more richly
textured.
The fundamental right to marry necessarily entails the freedom of
choice of a spouse. For homosexuals, that choice will be "different." But
much of the richness of relationships derives from that very freedom to
choose. An expansive vision of equality demands that society affirm differ-
ences in the name of freedom and humanity. As Justice Jackson pro-
claimed in West Virginia v. Barnette, "[F]reedom to differ is not limited
to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of free-
dom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch
the heart of the existing order." 09 Homosexual marriage shakes the ex-
isting moral order to its core. Yet society may have to abide with a touch
of moral uncertainty out of respect for our constitutional commitment to
equality and our moral commitment to justice and care.
marches. The sight of inequity enables the spectator to feel compassion and make connections.
The Ninth Circuit, however, took the leap of expanding the definition of immutability for equal
protection purposes in Watkins, partially because the majority empathized with homosexuals. Judge
Norris asked: "Would heterosexuals living in a city that passed an ordinance banning those who
engaged in sex with persons of the opposite sex find it easy not only to abstain from heterosexual
activity but also to shift the object of their sexual desires to persons of the same sex?" 837 F.2d 1428,
1446 (9th Cir. 1987).
107. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S 494, 504-05 (1977) (city housing ordinance
excluding extended family households from definition of family unconstitutional) ("Ours is by no
means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting members of the nuclear family. . . .[T]he
accumulated wisdom of civilization . . . supports a larger conception of the family."); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972) (free exercise clause of First Amendment guarantees Amish
parents right to keep children out of school after age 14) ("There can be no assumption that today's
majority is 'right' and the Amish and others like them are 'wrong.' A way of life that is odd or even
erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is differ-
ent."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
108. Moore required the city of East Cleveland to redefine "family" in its housing ordinances,
and Loving struck down 16 state anti-miscegenation laws.
109. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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